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ABSTRACT 
This report examines corporate inversions to determine whether this practice benefits the 
majority of stakeholders or merely a select few. A sample of firms previously incorporated in 
the United States that have since undergone inversions is examined to answer this question. 
Annual stock price returns, stock price volatility, and earnings per share changes from the 
sample of inversion firms are the main sources of data examined. These results are compared 
to the S&P 500 and peer firms to determine whether the changes can be attributed to the 
inversions, or are merely a result of general economic conditions. Supporting topics addressed 
in this paper include an overview of legislation related to inversions and suggestions to 
mitigate the negative consequences of inversions. This study shows that there are no 
observable benefits to shareholder wealth arising from corporate inversions. While there were 
changes in the data from pre to post inversion, they were not unique to the inversion firms as 
the same changes were observed in the peer firms. However, the study showed that there is a 
fundamental difference between inversion firms when compared to the S&P 500.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the growing prevalence of corporate inversions, an important question has yet to be 
answered. This project focuses primarily on shareholders who have been affected by 
corporate inversions that have taken place since 2008. Although inversions have been 
occurring for over 30 years, almost half have taken place since 2008. The impact of inversions 
on stakeholders prior to 2008 would not have been affected by the most recent legislation or 
economic conditions, which would not aid in drawing conclusions about inverting firms 
today. It can be assumed that corporate executives of the firm doing the inversion benefit 
from the practice, or else they would not allow the firm to engage in it. These executives are 
affected on the basis of salary increases, bonuses, and stock options due to positive impacts of 
the inversion on the firm’s tax liability. Shareholders can be affected by the actions of a firm 
in the form of changing stock price as well as dividend payments based on earnings per share. 
Additionally, the United States government is largely involved in the consequences of tax 
inversions because they lose billions of tax dollars every year as a result of firms 
reincorporating outside of the United States. This is the reason behind the multitude of recent 
legislation summarized in the literature review.   
 
This project serves to provide a critical analysis of the beneficiaries of corporate inversions. 
Through this analysis it will be determined whether inversions disproportionately benefit 
executives at the expense of other stakeholders. If this is true, then legislation and public 
sentiments condemning inversions are justified and should continue. This is because the 
primary duty of executives is to generate shareholder wealth. Additionally, knowing whether 
shareholders benefit from inversions will be a useful tool for investors in the future as they 
can avoid risky investments in companies that plan to do an inversion. If corporate inversions 
do generate shareholder wealth, then companies that have the potential to do an inversion 
should be sought after by investors. Regardless, the implications of inversions on the tax 
burden and tax base could explain the government’s opposition to inversions. Finally, this 
project can be used as a future reference for other studies as the government continues to pass 
legislation that makes it more difficult to do inversions. Future projects may find it useful to 
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know whether this legislation is well founded and can use the data collected as a starting point 
to compare to future data.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Key Terms 
In order to fully understand incentives to invert and legislation surrounding corporate 
inversions, there are several key terms which readers must be familiar with. One resource that 
is included in many different tax avoidance methods is a controlled foreign corporation, 
referred to as a CFC. A CFC is a subsidiary of the U.S. domestic corporation in which control 
is determined by shares owned by the domestic corporation. The CFC can conduct foreign 
business on behalf of the domestic corporation without incurring the U.S. corporate tax. 
Instead, the CFC adheres to the tax laws of the foreign country that it is incorporated in. The 
CFC can be used in various methods, discussed later, in which they conduct global business 
on behalf of the domestic parent and make loans to the parent company.  
 
It is also important to understand the distinction between a worldwide tax system and a 
territorial tax system. A country with a territorial tax system only taxes a company when it 
does business in that country (Yang, 2016, Corporate inversion strategies 48). Companies that 
are incorporated in a country that uses a territorial tax system do not have to pay that 
country’s corporate tax if they do business outside of that country and bring the proceeds from 
those transactions back to the country of incorporation. A worldwide tax system on the other 
hand taxes firms incorporated in that country on earnings no matter where they do business. 
The United States and China are the only two countries that use a worldwide tax system 
(Yang, 2016, Corporate inversion strategies 48). In the United States, this means a 35% 
corporate tax on all transactions conducted in the U.S., and firms have to pay the difference 
between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the tax rate of the other country in which they did 
business. For example, if a U.S. company conducts business in a country that has a 20% 
corporate tax rate, they will pay the 20% tax in that country, as well as a 15% tax when the 
money is repatriated to the United States.  
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Introduction  
The study of corporate inversions has become a very relevant and contemporary issue because 
the number of corporations that engage in the practice has been increasing at an increasing 
rate since the 1980’s. To this point over 80 U.S. companies have undergone corporate 
inversions for various reasons. A common misunderstanding concerning corporate inversions 
is that companies only attempt to change their domicile for the potential to lower their 
effective tax rate. While this is true in many cases, there are several more incentives caused 
by tax legislation that push companies out of the United States.  This trend has been causing a 
constant erosion of the U.S. tax base to a degree, and potentially has unintended consequences 
on the stockholders of these firms. This study takes new steps into the examination of 
corporate inversions by addressing the question of whether stockholders are 
disproportionately benefited by inversions compared to executive officers.  
 
The answer to this question is clearly valuable to investors who are considering what to do 
with currently owned stocks that are involved in a tax inversion deal. However, this study 
may also be used to substantiate claims that reform in the tax code is a necessary step in 
reducing the number of inversions. In addition to individuals in the accounting field who may 
be affected by dealing with companies who have already undergone or are considering 
inversions, economists may utilize the study to examine how the loss of government tax 
revenue is affecting the micro and macro economy. Lastly, people studying legislation need to 
be aware of recent developments as Congress has been cracking down on inversions. They 
have done this through passing temporary regulations, adding notices to the IRS tax code to 
close loopholes, and increasing the costs of corporate inversions to make them less attractive 
for corporations seeking to reap the benefits of corporate inversions.  
 
As previously mentioned, the question examined by this study is whether or not various 
stakeholders in corporations who undergo corporate inversions benefit disproportionately or 
are even worse off, post-inversion. The literature on this topic is examined to gather insight on 
how the corporate inversion trend grew to its current popularity as a business practice.  
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Background 
While corporate inversions are being addressed increasingly in the news and in political 
policy discussions, it is not a new corporate strategy. In fact, corporate inversions have been 
in practice since 1983, when the first U.S. company, McDermott International, reincorporated 
from the U.S. to Panama. It took ten years until in 1993, Helen of Troy also used an inversion 
to access overseas funds. Even with that large gap between the pioneers of inversions, 29 
inversions took place in the 20 years between 1983 and 2003. The trend continued and 
increased in popularity rapidly in the ten years following, where 47 additional companies 
inverted between 2004 and 2014 (Ways and Means, 2014). Today, even against resistance 
from legislators and public sentiment, high profile firms continue to plan inversion deals 
worth hundreds of billions of dollars due to the benefits associated with corporate inversions 
(Novack, 2014).  
 
Clearly, many firms have done a corporate inversion in the last several decades. The 
incentives to invert includes lowering their effective tax rate, escaping the worldwide tax 
system, and avoiding the repatriation tax since many have foreign income that are 
permanently reinvested. A study conducted using Fortune 500 companies identified the 
magnitude of permanently deferred foreign income. According to the study, “By the end of 
2014, the 286 Fortune 500 companies that report holding offshore cash had collectively 
accumulated over $2.5 trillion that they declare to be “permanently reinvested” (McIntyre, 
2015, 10). This already massive and growing pool of un-repatriated earnings plays a major 
role, among the other factors, in incentivizing firms to plan inversion deals.  
 
When examining corporate inversions, it is important to determine how the massive 
accumulation of overseas funds came into existence in addition to how firms carry out 
inversions. This is because it is a primary incentive that causes firms to invert. Harold 
McClure analyzes several different case studies of inversions throughout the last 34 years to 
describe the different methods used during that time to stash their funds abroad and 
subsequently invert to access those funds. McClure describes a proposed strategic move by 
one of the most well-known and profitable corporations in the world. He states that Wal-Mart, 
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a company with $72 billion in sales and $2.5 billion of profit from the United States is 
considering re-domiciling in Switzerland (McClure, 2014, 10). What this means is that Wal-
Mart would renounce its citizenship as a U.S. corporation and move its tax address to the 
foreign country while continuing to operate in the U.S. and around the world like it always 
has. While the operations of Wal-Mart go completely unchanged, the way they are taxed 
becomes completely different. Rather than being subject to a worldwide 35% corporate tax 
from the United States, they would only pay that corporate tax on operations in the U.S. 
Additionally, they would be free to only pay the tax rate of other countries that they do 
business in, like Switzerland, which has a corporate tax rate just below 18%. It is very logical 
for companies to seek this tax savings when no movement of assets is required in most cases. 
Marian makes the point that it, “makes no business sense,” to dislocate assets during the 
inversion process (Marian, 2015, 72). This is because the time and costs of transferring assets 
is unnecessary for the process and the gains from tax savings would be offset by the costs of 
dislocating those assets. This is the classic and simplest form of an inversion; however recent 
legislation has made it more difficult for firms to leave the United States. Today the 
requirements for a firm to invert are much more complicated and costly than simply 
renouncing their citizenship.  
 
Early in the history of inversions, the company Helen of Troy used a tax avoidance method 
known as transfer pricing to achieve substantial tax savings and move their earnings abroad. 
The company, which sells various housewares and personal products, acts as a distributor and 
incurs operating expenses for a portion of sales. A parent corporation in Bermuda owns most 
of the intangibles belonging to the company, and purchases the products from the U.S. 
company and proceeds to sell them to worldwide affiliates. In this way, the Bermuda parent 
company is able to capture a majority of sales while incurring minimal operating expenses. 
This is very advantageous because there is no corporate income tax in Bermuda which means 
the parent company can retain all profits. Additionally, the U.S. domestic corporation reduces 
their taxable income by taking on most of the operating expenses. In this way, the model 
provided by McClure estimated an effective tax rate for Helen of Troy of 14.4%, far lower 
than the 35% corporate tax rate in the U.S. (McClure, 2014). 
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McClure also gives an example of tax avoidance that could one day incentivize Walgreens to 
invert. An important distinction raised between Walgreens and Wal-Mart that must be noted 
is that Walgreens does business almost exclusively in the United States, while Wal-Mart is 
clearly a more global business. The benefit Walgreens would receive is known as earnings 
stripping. While they would still have to pay the high U.S. corporate tax, they could utilize a 
controlled foreign company, known as a CFC, to transfer U.S. income abroad. This is 
achieved primarily through intercompany debt, or royalty payments on use of intangible 
assets such as patents (McClure, 2014, 11). The difference between the advantages in these 
two cases is that the first granted immunity from the worldwide tax system of the United 
States, while the second allowed a company still based in the United States to shift its 
domestic income abroad to avoid the tax.  
 
A final tax avoidance method worth discussing is known as a hopscotch loan. Under U.S. tax 
laws, a loan from a CFC to the U.S. domestic corporation is treated as a dividend and is 
taxable. In order to avoid this tax, a foreign parent corporation is required. The foreign parent 
is created in a tax haven as a parent corporation to the CFC. The CFC can then resume 
making intercompany loans to the foreign parent without passing the funds through the U.S. 
domestic corporation, thus avoiding the tax (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversions 44). 
 
In the subsequent section discussing government legislation responding to the inversion trend, 
it can be seen that many of the tax avoidance previously discussed become unviable. As a 
result, firms must consider enacting a corporate inversion in order to access their overseas 
cash. A common method of inversion that allows a corporation to change its tax domicile 
requires the use of a foreign corporation to take part in a merger. As described by Marples 
(2014), the U.S. company can seek a smaller foreign company to acquire, or can be acquired 
by a larger foreign company. In the first situation, the U.S. shareholders retain control of the 
company by owning a majority share while the company is still allowed to reincorporate in 
the country of the acquisition target. Marples cites the Eaton Cooper merger as an example of 
this inversion method where Eaton acquired Cooper while retaining 73% majority share and 
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incorporating the new company in Ireland where Cooper was already incorporated (Marples, 
2014, 3). The tax savings in this deal were substantial in that of the total cost savings of $535 
million, $165 million were tax related savings (Marples, 2014, 4). In the second situation the 
tax implications are very similar, but control of the company shifts to the foreign acquiring 
company because they own the majority share of the new merger. An example of this 
situation was the merger between the larger United Kingdom firm Ensco, and the smaller U.S. 
firm Pride. After the merger, Pride became the minority shareholder in the company and 
moved their tax domicile to the United Kingdom where the parent company was located 
(Marples, 2014, 3). Regardless of the direction of the acquisition, the result is tax savings on 
international operations for the U.S. company involved in the merger. 
 
It is simple to understand why legislators are attempting to close tax loopholes and prevent the 
validity of inversion methods when the amount of lost tax revenue is identified. In order to 
understand how the U.S. economy got to where it is today, with over $2.5 trillion of 
permanently reinvested funds and dozens of expatriated firms, one must understand the 
current legislation affecting inversions. The following section outlines the details of IRS 
section 7874, various rules that inversion companies must meet, and legislative notices 
relating to section 7874. 
 
Significant Legislation 
The following section is a breakdown of the tax laws pertaining to inversions, broken down 
by location in the tax code. These laws and regulations are important to the study because 
they show attempts by the U.S. government to prevent inversions by making it more difficult 
to set up an inversion deal. Additionally, they close many of the tax loopholes that the 
previous inversion methods exploited. This makes many of the previous methods impossible 
to use after the passage of regulation. 
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IRS Section 7874 
 In effect since 2004 (DiFronzo, 2016, 50). 
 Developed to prevent inversion transactions that did not result in a significant 
change in ownership or operations of the corporation (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 Requires the foreign acquirer to own “substantially all of the properties of the U.S. 
corporation” (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 The domestic corporation interest holders must hold certain amounts of stock in 
the foreign corporation (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 The new group of companies must have substantial business in the country where 
the foreign acquiring company is located (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 The 80/60 rule under section 7874 requires the ownership fraction of the U.S. 
corporation to be at least 60%, but less than 80%. If it is higher than 80% it will be 
treated as a U.S. company for tax purposes. (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 If there is a gain on the transfer of stock during the inversion process, an excise tax 
is imposed on shareholders (DiFronzo, 2016, 50). 
 
Temporary Regulations Under Section 7874 
 Disregards foreign stock from requirement included in the 80/60 rule when the 
foreign acquiring company has made other U.S. acquisitions in the last 36 months 
before acquisition (DiFronzo, 2016, 48). 
 Disregards transactions that make the domestic company smaller prior to the 
inversion (DiFronzo, 2016, 48). 
 Parent of the foreign acquiring company must be a tax resident in the same country 
as the foreign acquiring company (DiFronzo, 2016, 48). 
 
Notice 2014-52 
 If less than 25% of business activity takes place in the foreign parent’s home 
country, the foreign parent is treated as a U.S. corporation (Ruffner, 2015, 16). 
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 U.S. companies can no longer access funds from CFC’s via hopscotch loans 
(Ruffner, 2015, 16). 
 All investments, loans, or stock purchases from CFC to domestic company or 
foreign affiliates are treated as dividends (Ruffner, 2015, 16). 
 Stock related to the 80/60 rule requirement is disregarded if 50% of the assets 
belonging to the foreign parent are passive, such as cash and marketable securities 
(Ruffner, 2015, 17). 
 Limited ability to create a separate entity out of an existing business unit to 
participate in an inversion (Ruffner, 2015, 17). 
 
Notice 2015-79 
 CFC substantial business test requires CFC to conduct 25% of business and be a 
tax resident of its own foreign country (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies 
52). 
 Second CFC’s created before mergers to dilute U.S. equity share is not included in 
calculation of 80/60 rule (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies 52). 
 Stock issued by CFC to foreign shareholders for passive assets is ignored (Yang, 
2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies 52). 
 
Section 367 
 Asset dilution rule requires foreign subsidiaries to recognize gains on property 
transferred to a foreign transferee corporation (New Rules, 2016, 3). 
 Post-inversion acquisitions by CFC’s of the foreign parent’s debt or equity 
interests are treated as U.S. property (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
 CFC’s will remain a U.S. subsidiary even if given a majority equity position by the 
foreign parent (DiFronzo, 2016, 49). 
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Research Comparison 
The articles consulted for this study were very homogenous in some aspects, yet varied 
widely in others. In examining the corporate inversion trend, the authors of the articles had 
varied explanations for the factors that incentivize firms to seek inversions. However, most 
researchers on this subject tend to agree on the fact that elements of the tax system in the 
United States act as a force to push firms to reincorporate abroad. Lastly, the consequences of 
inversions had mixed descriptions depending on the article. 
 
With the complexity of inversions in general, in conjunction with the different types of firms 
and conditions that affect the inversions, it is unsurprising that researchers come up with 
varied explanations for the factors that provide incentive for inversions. According to 
Clausing (2014), the biggest incentives include growing stockpiles of overseas cash, 
anticipation of a tax holiday, and a follow the leader effect (Clausing, 2014, 1). As was 
mentioned earlier, the amount of permanently reinvested funds from U.S. corporations is over 
$2.5 trillion dollars. This stockpile of un-repatriated funds carries two connected effects with 
it. First, firms are incentivized to invert so that they have access to this overseas cash without 
paying the U.S. corporate tax upon repatriation. Second, the longer the stockpile goes without 
repatriation, the higher the cost in taxes that will be incurred. Clausing’s second incentive that 
firms are anticipating a tax holiday perpetuates the growth of the overseas stockpile, thus 
feeding back into the first incentive mentioned. The follow the leader scenario that Clausing 
alludes to is that as some firms are successful in completing corporate inversions and show 
economic improvement, more firms are incentivized to emulate the same strategy. 
Additionally, competing firms will feel the need to invert simply to remain competitive with 
firms that are already reaping the benefits of corporate inversions. Sheppard also cites this as 
being a factor that causes firms to invert. Buckstein offers very different incentives explaining 
why some firms choose to attempt corporate inversions. Buckstein claims that in a globalizing 
world, firms are looking for ways to expand their business and gain access to human capital 
(Buckstein, 2014, 1). What he is stating is that due to the high costs of expanding a business 
into a global market, inversions can help mitigate that cost by lowering taxes and merging 
with a firm that has already established global connections. Additionally, the global 
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connection to an acquiring firm can help a business become exposed to new talent in the form 
of human capital.  
 
When it comes to discussing the consequences of inversions, researchers agree on more 
issues, yet still debate the observed outcome of others. For example, Desai and Hines agree 
with Frydam that managers of firms carrying out corporate inversions are acting in the best 
interest of the shareholders. While some studies examining the short term effects of inversion 
news on stock price show that changes in stock price can be volatile, they observed that 
shareholder wealth is maximized in the form of capital gains (Desai, 2002, 4). Sheppard also 
supports this claim by stating that inversion deals have to be approved by the shareholders and 
in that sense, the shareholders would not vote to carry through with the inversion if they did 
not believe that they would gain from the strategy (Sheppard, 2002, 560). Another point that 
researchers and legislators agree on is that the inversion trend is eroding the tax base of the 
United States. Sheppard cites this in his article as a definite consequence of inversions and is 
supported by Clausing who cites a study that claims simply limiting some aspects of 
inversions will save $19 billion in tax dollars over 10 years (Clausing, 2014, 6). Where some 
researchers differ, involves the impact of inversions on jobs and capital. Many feel that 
inversions result in an exodus of jobs from the domestic country. Desai claims in his paper 
that the firms that are most likely to invert are those that are large and possess a large number 
of physical assets abroad. Clausing also makes the assertion that after the last tax holiday in 
2004, there were no new jobs created, making it unlikely that the government will have 
another in the near future (Clausing, 2014, 5). This counters the claim that a tax holiday 
would be a possible solution for the issue of stopping the trend. Sheppard takes a different 
stance on this matter, claiming inversions do not reduce the number of jobs because the 
operations of a firm are unchanged after an inversion. Rather, the tax laws affecting the 
corporation is the only aspect changed as a result of an inversion (Sheppard, 2002, 559). Rao 
also claims that an unintended consequence of prohibiting easy forms of inversions has 
caused the spike in foreign mergers and acquisitions, which is one of the more popular 
inversion methods today (Rao, 2015, 21).  
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The component of all the studies that is the most homogenous is the perception of the current 
United States corporate tax system. Most researchers agree that the high tax rate itself is a 
factor that pushes firms away from the U.S. However, the fact that firms such as Burger King 
Worldwide Inc. move their domicile to a country with a similar effective tax rate points to the 
worldwide tax system as being a primary motivator for firms to leave the U.S. All of the 
researchers who provided potential solutions to stopping the inversion trend stated that the 
U.S. should adopt a territorial tax system like the rest of the world. While this move is highly 
unlikely due to impact it would have on the government’s tax revenue, Sheppard expresses 
the belief held by many other researchers that simply lowering the corporate tax rate by 5% 
would reduce the number of inversions as well as limit the practice of earnings stripping 
(Sheppard, 2002, 571). Buckstein supports this action as well by stating that lowering the tax 
rate would put the United States in a position to be much more competitive in terms of being a 
desired corporate destination, yet makes the point that a lower tax rate should be a part of a 
larger widespread overhaul of the tax system (Buckstein, 2014, 1). While these are the main 
points of agreement among researchers, there are also other proposed solutions pointed out by 
Clausing and Sheppard such as raising the foreign parent equity requirement associated with 
the 80/60 rule, limiting cash transfer methods, and pressuring tax haven countries to change 
their laws. While some of these proposed solutions may be very radical and different, the 
theme of reducing the number of inversions is constant. 
 
The research conducted in the majority of these articles was qualitative. Inversions were 
studied by describing the attributes of the companies that had done inversions and the 
methods that they used to complete the inversion. The descriptions of the inversion methods 
were supplemented by summaries of the legislation passed concerning the taxation of inverted 
corporations. This was primarily concerning IRS Code Section 7874 and supplemental notices 
such as 2014-52 and 2015-79. The conclusions drawn from these studies were also 
qualitative. Offering proposed suggestions for ways in which the tax system could be 
reformed to place the United States on a more level playing field with the rest of the world. 
Some of the articles were quantitative however. Rao’s article examined the short term impact 
of inversion announcements on stock price. These figures came from stock price history 
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gathered on a number of firms that represent the total number of firms that have done 
inversions. This data along with other estimates such as the potential tax savings from various 
tax reform plans and the effective tax rate estimates of inverted firms provides a strong base 
on which the authors structured their recommendations and conclusions. While these 
quantitative steps were a good starting point to answering the question of whether 
shareholders benefit from inversions, there is much more that can be done through further 
study. At the time when many of these articles were written, some of the legislation restricting 
inversions had not yet been passed. Additionally, not enough time had passed to see the long 
term effect of inversions on shareholders. This is one area that can now be expanded upon, to 
include more data to calculate the long term effects on total shareholder wealth, rather than 
limited data on short term stock price fluctuations.  
 
Conclusion of Literature Review 
The literature on the subject of corporate inversions was very helpful in shaping my 
understanding of the trend as well as the progress that has been made in the field. The 
background history of inversions is very demonstrative of the different ways companies have 
stockpiled funds overseas and then inverted to access those funds. Over the years this has 
allowed them to circumvent legislation and achieve different benefits. Additionally, the 
summaries of legislation will be one of the most critical components to understanding how the 
trend developed and got to the level that it currently occupies. This is because if certain 
legislation under Code Section 7874 had not been passed, some of the methods that firms use 
to avoid taxes and invert may never have been used because there would have been no need 
for them. The most recent notices passed to support Code Section 7874 also reduce or 
eliminate many of the advantages provided by inversions. This must be taken into account 
because if inversions can no longer provide the benefits to shareholder wealth that they did in 
the past, they would certainly be disadvantageous to shareholders.  
 
When constructing my qualitative and quantitative methods for answering the question of 
whether inversions disproportionately benefit shareholders and executives, I sought to build 
upon the work of Rao, who studied the short term effects of inversion announcements on 
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stock prices. I improved upon their methodology primarily by using a larger timeframe to 
examine the companies. Also, I took into account more factors that impact shareholder wealth 
to address the claims by Frydam, Sheppard, and other researchers who claim that inversions 
maximize shareholder wealth in the long run rather than short term stock prices.  
 
As previously mentioned, some of the proposed solutions to mitigate the inversion trend 
include altering the tax system to be a friendlier environment for corporations by lowering the 
tax rate and moving toward a territorial tax system. Regardless of what may appear to be the 
best solution, it is important to critically examination what the most plausible solution might 
be. This is because while an overhaul of the tax system might result in the most dramatic 
change in the inversion trend, it is unlikely to occur because of the guaranteed loss tax 
revenue. The government is much more likely to continue on the path it currently follows by 
closing loopholes and issuing notices to make inversions more difficult and less profitable. 
METHODOLOGY 
This project was designed to be a quantitative study, that would be used as evidence to aid 
investors in deciding how to handle investments in companies that announced plans to 
execute a corporate inversion. In order to accomplish this, I selected a number of companies 
to study and evaluated them based on a number of criteria. The companies had to have 
inverted since 2008 because inversions prior to that year would not have been affected by 
some of the more recent legislation and economic conditions. This is still a representative 
sample because almost half of corporate inversions have occurred since 2008, even though it 
has been a documented practice for over 30 years.  The companies also had to be publicly 
traded so that the relevant data would be available. Therefore, 28 companies of various sizes 
and industries were selected as seen in Appendix A. The list was compiled primarily by cross 
referencing the Bloomberg article “Tracking Tax Runaways,” and Rao’s study titled, 
“Corporate Inversions and Economic Performance,” on the short term effects of inversions on 
stock prices.  
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After selecting the sample companies, I obtained key information to be used in the 
quantitative analysis. This information included the year of inversion, industry, stock price 
history, earnings per share (EPS) levels, and market cap for each company. These metrics 
were chosen to evaluate the companies because they are primary inputs when measuring 
shareholder wealth. Changes in stock price have an obvious impact on the shareholders 
because it determines how the market value of their investments change over time. 
Noteworthy changes in stock returns before and after inversions are important for investors 
because it would help them determine the impact of inversions on shareholder wealth. The 
standard deviation of the returns was also calculated to measure the volatility of the stock 
price. Lastly, EPS is the ratio of income available for common shareholders to the number of 
shares outstanding. It is useful for investors because it provides a metric for the profitability 
of the company. The year of inversion for each company was obtained at the same time the 
companies to be studied were determined from the sources previously mentioned. The 
industry each company operates in was determined using the Mergent Online database. The 
stock price history was researched using Yahoo Finance. The EPS levels and market cap for 
each firm were obtained from the Calcbench database.  
 
When analyzing the data gathered for each company, a similar approach was used for each 
metric. Data was averaged for a number of years prior to the inversion and then compared to 
average data for a period of time after the inversion. For the stock price, the time frame 
consisted of a maximum of five years before and after the inversion. Neither set of average 
data contained information from the actual inversion year. To analyze changes in the stock 
price, the yearly return was calculated from historical stock prices and then averaged to get 
comparable returns for pre inversion and post inversion periods. When studying the EPS, an 
average was taken for all of the years prior to the inversion, and all of the years post 
inversion. Then the percent change between the pre inversion and post inversion average was 
calculated in order to compare all of the firms.  
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Once there was a pre and post inversion average yearly return and percent change in EPS, the 
data could be examined from a number of viewpoints. These viewpoints consisted of an 
aggregate, industry, and firm size level.  
RESULTS 
When studying corporate inversions, it is interesting to note the technical details about them 
in addition to their impact on shareholders. One of these details is where companies go when 
they decide to reincorporate. As illustrated by the graph below, Bermuda is the most popular 
destination for companies deciding to invert, followed closely by Ireland. These two 
destinations represent over half of inversions. This is due to the favorable laws related to 
corporate taxation in 
these countries. The 
illustration includes all 
companies determined 
to have engaged in 
corporate inversions 
and exceeds the list of 
companies used for the 
quantitative element of 
the study.  
 
It is also interesting to note the timing of inversions. As shown in the illustration below, the 
first 
inversion 
took place in 
1982 when 
the company 
McDermott 
International 
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reincorporated to Panama. Since then, over 80 companies have followed in their footsteps and 
reincorporated in another country. The trend gained momentum, but years in which the 
number of inversions declined can be attributed to federal legislation and tax holidays 
discussed in the literature review. These events occurred around the same time periods during 
which the inversion trend exhibits a decrease. Most notable is that almost half of all 
inversions have taken place in the last 8 years. This shows that the practice of corporate 
inversions is gaining popularity among corporate executives and will continue unless action is 
taken. The impact of inversions that will be discussed next will become more widespread the 
longer the practice continues. The illustration includes all companies determined to have 
engaged in corporate inversions and exceeds the list of companies used for the quantitative 
element of the study. 
 
Effect on EPS 
The impact on EPS for companies that engaged in a corporate inversion was the most 
conclusive metric studied. When examining the average impact on all of the firms used in the 
study, the percent change from years before the inversion to years after the inversion was        
-189.30%. When narrowing the number of firms by industry, the results were the same in that 
the percent change in EPS was negative for all industries.  
 
The effect of inversions on EPS was also examined through the lens of firm size. The firms in 
the study distributed evenly in to three groups based on market cap. The groups consisted of 
less than $1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and greater than $10 billion. For firms 
with a market cap below $1 billion, the percent change in EPS from pre inversion years to 
post inversion years was very negative, at -577.73%. For firms between $1 billion and $10 
billion, the impact on EPS was still negative but to a lesser degree, at -30.08%. Only the firms 
with a market cap over $10 billion had a positive percent change in EPS, at 11.25%. The 
figures on the effect of inversions on EPS previously discussed can be found in the summary 
data table in Appendix B. 
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Effect on the Stock Price 
The change in average stock price returns from pre inversion years to post inversion years 
also differed between industries and firm size. When all companies used in the study were 
averaged together, the stock price returns showed a decrease from a 25.43% return to a 
12.74% return. However, the standard deviation of the returns for all companies decreased 
from 68.63% to 44.39%. When the results are broken down by industry, it is clear that the 
stock price of companies in some industries showed improvement while others suffered. The 
service industry returns improved modestly from 16.16% to 23.06%. The insurance industry 
returns also rose from 3.48% to 8.24%. Lastly, firms in the manufacturing industry had 
returns that increased from 6.42% to 12.17% on average. Conversely, the oil industry showed 
a decrease from 23.93% to 16.25%. The health industry exhibited the worst decline in stock 
price returns from 43.76% pre inversion to 7.34% post inversion. In conformity with the total 
standard deviation decreasing, firms in the insurance, health, and oil industries also had lower 
standard deviations related to stock price returns post inversion. Firms in the service and 
manufacturing industries both had higher standard deviations after inversions took place.  
 
At the firm size level, average stock price returns for companies with a market cap below $1 
billion decreased substantially from 55.44% to 16.26%. However, the standard deviation also 
decreased similar to the total average. Firms who had a market cap between $1 billion and 
$10 billion had higher returns of 9.85%, up from 4.61% pre inversion. This came at the cost 
of a higher standard deviation as well. Lastly, firms with a market cap higher than $10 billion 
were unique in that their average stock price return decreased from 14.80% to 12.43%, but the 
standard deviation for those firms also increased from 30.92% to 43.85%. The figures on the 
effect of inversions on the stock price previously discussed can be found in the summary data 
table in Appendix B. 
 
Sensitivity Test 
As was mentioned previously, data from the year of inversion was not included in the 
calculations of either to pre or post inversion average for stock price returns or EPS. However, 
I performed a sensitivity test to observe the impact of including the inversion year in the pre 
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inversion average and in the post inversion average separately. The pre and post inversion 
returns and the percent change in EPS were calculated without either group including data 
from the inversion year. This was used as the benchmark to judge the other tests against. 
When data from the inversion year was included in the pre inversion average, the pre 
inversion stock price return increased slightly, and the percent change in EPS was slightly less 
negative. This shows that during the inversion year, there was a slightly positive market 
reaction, but no major changes to the stock price. However, when the inversion year data was 
included in the post inversion averages the average stock price return more than doubled in a 
positive direction. This shows that the market reaction was somewhat delayed. The 
implications for this are that investors may not respond immediately after an inversion 
because there is no observable change in the value of the investment. According to these 
observations it takes a period of time for the market to react negatively, at which point it may 
be too late for investors. However, if investors are aware of the potential negative long term 
effects of inversions on stock price returns they may have time to take action. When 
determining the average pre and post inversion percent change in EPS, twice the interquartile 
range was used as a cutoff to identify outliers. The data tables for the sensitivity test can be 
found in Appendix C. The identified outliers in the table are highlighted, and were excluded 
from the average.  
 
T-Tests 
Regarding the average stock price returns and volatility of the stock price, it was seen through 
the analysis that the volatility of the stock price decreased at the expense of lower returns for 
inverting firms. I wanted to know whether these changes were a result of the inversions or if 
there was another unknown cause. In order to determine this, I performed a series of t-tests. 
The first t-test compared the stock price volatility results from the inverting firms to the S&P 
500. In order to compare the group of inversion firms to the S&P 500 I first downloaded the 
historical data for the S&P 500 from Yahoo Finance and calculated the annual returns for the 
years 2004 through 2016. I then used these returns and simulated what the pre and post 
inversion returns would have been if the firms that comprise the S&P 500 had done an 
inversion for the years 2008 through 2015. Lastly, the standard deviations of those returns 
Do Some Stakeholders in Publicly Traded Firms Benefit at the Expense of Others as a 
Result of Corporate Inversions? 
Senior Capstone Project for Ryan Hitchcock 
- 22 - 
was calculated so that the t-test could be performed. The S&P statistics were then compared 
to those of the inversion firms by using a two sample t-test assuming unequal variances. The 
hypothesized mean difference for this test was 0, and the alpha was set to 0.05. As can be seen 
in Appendix E, the two tailed p-value is smaller than the alpha value both pre and post 
inversion. In addition, the absolute value of the t statistic is greater than the t critical value in 
both the pre and post inversion test. Both of these results provide statistical justification to 
reject the null hypothesis. This means that even before the inversion took place, there was 
something that made inversion firms fundamentally different from the S&P 500. 
 
The next set of t-tests compared the stock price returns and volatility of the inversion firms to 
a matched competitor that was chosen based on industry, size, and financial strength. The list 
of peer firms can be found in Appendix D. For each matched competitor, the same process for 
determining the pre and post inversion average return and standard deviation was followed. 
The inversion year for the paired inversion company was used as the cutoff year in simulating 
how the firms would have compared during the same time period with the inversion being the 
primary difference between them. Once the competitors were selected and the hypothetical 
inversion year was determined I calculated the yearly stock price return for up to five years 
before and after the inversion year depending on the availability of data. The historical stock 
prices were drawn from Yahoo Finance, the same data source that was used in studying the 
inversion firms. After determining the yearly returns, I calculated the pre and post inversion 
standard deviations of those returns and averaged the returns to obtain an average pre and post 
inversion stock price return that could be compared for statistical similarity to the inverting 
firms. The paired sample t-test was performed four times. The four tests compared the 
inversion firms to the competitors regarding pre inversion stock price returns, post inversion 
stock price returns, pre inversion standard deviation of the returns, and post inversion standard 
deviation of the returns. For each test, the null hypothesis was that the hypothesized mean 
difference of the metric being studied would be 0, assuming an alpha value of 0.05.  
 
For the test analyzing pre inversion average returns, the two-tailed p-value was very high at 
0.86 and the t statistic was smaller than the t critical value. This shows that the inversion firms 
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were statistically similar to the matched competitor firms in terms of average stock price 
return pre inversion. This was the expected result because pre inversion, the firms should have 
been very similar to their peers that were matched based on industry, size, and financial 
condition. Moving to the t-test comparing the same metric post inversion, there is a slight 
change in the output. The p-value decreased to 0.56 and the absolute value of the t statistic 
increased to 0.59. While there was a change, the p-value is still larger than the alpha value and 
the t statistic is still smaller than the t critical value. This shows that from pre inversion to post 
inversion, there was no statistically significant change to the annual stock price returns 
compared to the peer firms. Therefore, any changes in annual returns for the inversion firms 
can be attributed to general economic conditions and not the inversion. The output tables for 
this t-test can be found in Appendix F. 
 
The results of the t-test regarding the standard deviation of the returns produced similar 
results. Pre inversion, the p-value of 0.81 implies no statistically significant difference 
between the groups. This is confirmed by the t statistic which lower than the t critical value. 
Once again, in regards to the volatility of the stock price the inversion firms were very similar 
to their peers pre inversion. This is congruent with the expectations since the firms were 
matched based on industry, size and financial condition. Similar to the test of the average 
return, there was no statistically relevant change in the correlation of the returns post 
inversion. The p-value of 0.53 and a low t statistic again imply no statistically significant 
difference between the groups. The output tables of this t-test can be found in appendix E.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the data previously summarized in the results section, there are several conclusions 
that can be drawn regarding whether firms aided or harmed their shareholders through 
corporate inversions. When examining the pre inversion and post inversion returns filtered by 
industry, firms in the service, insurance, and manufacturing industries all exhibited 
improvement. Firms in the service industry showed the most improvement, as the returns in 
that industry increased by 6.9%. While the average returns for the service industry increased, 
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it came at the cost of higher stock price volatility as shown by the larger standard deviation. 
Firms in the manufacturing and insurance industries had slightly lower increases of their 
returns by 5.75% and 4.76% respectively. However, manufacturing firms were subject to the 
same consequence as service firms in the form of more volatile stock price returns.  
 
Each firm size also displayed different benefits. Relatively small firms with a market cap 
below $1 billion had a less volatile stock price through a lower standard deviation of stock 
price returns. Medium sized firms, with a market cap between $1 billion and $10 billion, 
benefited differently by being the only firm size group to have higher stock price returns. The 
returns for medium sized firms increased by 5.24%. Relatively large firms with a market cap 
above $10 billion were the only ones to have higher earnings post inversion. The EPS for 
these firms increased by 11.25% on average.  
 
While there were numerous benefits to shareholders as previously mentioned, there were 
equally as many disadvantages. The only finding that was nearly unanimous across all 
industries and firm sizes was that EPS was lower post inversion. Firms in the oil industry had 
the worst decrease in EPS, followed closely by insurance. Another negative implication for 
firms in the oil industry was that their average stock price returns were 7.68% lower post 
inversion. The only other industry that had lower returns in addition to lower earnings was the 
health industry. The returns post inversion for the health industry were the lowest compared to 
pre inversion returns among all industries. The returns for firms in the health industry 
decreased by 36.42%. This is especially significant considering the fact that the health 
industry represented the industry with the most inversions in the study. The breakdown of 
inversions per industry can be seen in the following diagram.  
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When the firms 
are filtered by 
relative size, 
each group had a 
distinct pairing 
of disadvantages 
and that offset 
the single 
redeeming factor 
for shareholders 
as discussed previously. For relatively small firms, stock price returns were lower post 
inversion in addition to lower average EPS offset the benefit of a less volatile stock price. 
Medium sized firms also had lower EPS and had more volatile stock prices. This counteracts 
the benefit to shareholders of higher average stock price returns. Lastly, shareholders in large 
firms were disadvantaged through lower returns accompanied by a more volatile stock price. 
These harmful effects could potentially negate the benefit large firms enjoyed in the form of 
higher earnings post inversion.   
 
Even with the noted pairs of advantages and disadvantages for firms in different industries 
and of different sizes, many of the findings are called into question when comparing the 
inversion firms to their competitors. While the stock price returns decreased for inversion 
firms after the inversion, the same pattern was exhibited for their competitors who did not 
invert. This suggests that the reduction in stock price returns was not directly caused by the 
inversions, but by general economic conditions. A similar result was observed in testing the 
volatility results of the inversion firms against their competitors. Non-inversion firms showed 
a similar decrease in volatility compared to inversion firms over the same period of time. The 
t-test showed that the difference in volatility between the inversion firms and their peers was 
not statistically relevant, meaning the inversions had no significant impact on the volatility of 
the annual returns.  
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It is interesting that both pre and post inversion, the inversion firms remained similar to their 
competitors on the basis of annual returns and volatility. However, there was something 
fundamentally different about inversion firms even before the inversion when comparing their 
volatility to the volatility of the S&P 500. This fundamental difference could be a pressure 
that causes firms to execute inversions. Otherwise, it calls into question the actions of 
management because executives are supposed to be looking out for shareholder wealth above 
all else. This study shows that their decision to carry through with an inversion had no 
statistically significant impact on long term shareholder wealth. Even if the inversion was 
necessitated by the need to access overseas cash, management should have been more 
cognizant of the fact that shareholders would not share in the benefits. Investors should keep 
these facts in mind when evaluating whether a company represents a good financial 
investment. If executive compensation is not aligned with shareholder wealth, it is possible 
that they may make decisions such as voting on a corporate inversion, which is shown to have 
no impact on shareholder wealth in the long run.  
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
While this study addressed an important question, there are some potential limitations such as 
topics that exceeded the scope of this project, and ways in which the methodology could have 
been improved. An assumption made in this study is that executives of inversion firms are 
benefiting in terms of additional compensation. However, the extent of the benefits they 
receive from inversions was not explored. This would be an interesting topic for future studies 
to build upon the degree of difference between executive and shareholder impacts resulting 
from inversions. One of the most conclusive results in the study was the change in EPS from 
pre inversion to post inversion. However, the issuance of new shares could have had an 
impact on the results and explain the observed change. Future studies could verify the results 
in this study by controlling for the number of shares outstanding in the calculation of EPS and 
stock returns. Lastly the results could be fortified in future studies by increasing the number 
of firms studied. As time progresses, the list of firms that complete inversions will increase. 
Their data could further confirm or deny the conclusion that there are no observable benefits 
to shareholder wealth caused by corporate inversions.   
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Appendix A – List of companies studied  
 
 
Co Inversion Year Industry
ACN 5/26/2009 Service
AGII 3/14/2007 Insurance
ALKS 5/9/2011 Health
ALLE 6/17/2013 Service
AMAT 9/24/2013 Manufacturing
AON 1/13/2012 Insurance
ASPS 5/13/2009 Service
CVEO 9/29/2014 Service
ENDP 11/5/2013 Health
ESV 11/9/2009 Oil
ETN 5/21/2012 Manufacturing
GBLI 2/16/2010 Insurance
HZNP 3/19/2014 Health
JAZZ 5/19/2011 Health
LBTYA 2/5/2013 Service
MDT 6/15/2014 Health
MYL 7/14/2014 Health
PGN 9/24/2013 Oil
PNR 3/28/2012 Manufacturing
PRGO 7/29/2013 Health
QSR 8/26/2014 Restaurants
RDC 8/26/2014 Oil
SSYS 4/16/2012 Manufacturing
TBPH 4/25/2013 Health
TROX 9/26/2011 Manufacturing
TWGP 7/30/2012 Insurance
VRX 6/21/2010 Health
WMGI 10/27/2014 Health
XL 1/9/2015 Insurance
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Appendix B – Summary data table of results 
 
 
  
EPS Return Pre Return Post STD D Pre STD D Post
Industry Average -189.30% 25.43% 12.74% 68.63% 44.39%
Service -45.93% 16.16% 23.06% 34.55% 61.50%
Insurance -298.97% 3.48% 8.24% 26.65% 17.61%
Health -157.68% 43.76% 7.34% 96.07% 39.23%
Manufacturing -186.65% 6.42% 12.17% 44.53% 63.72%
Oil -311.72% 23.93% 16.25% 83.15% 37.33%
Restaurant 16.49% 41.96%
Size Average
Mkt Cap<1B -577.73% 55.44% 16.26% 142.64% 42.09%
1B<Mkt Cap<10B -30.08% 4.61% 9.85% 32.57% 46.94%
Mkt Cap>10B 11.25% 14.80% 12.43% 30.92% 43.85%
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Appendix C – Sensitivity test  
 
 
 
 
Co Inversion Year Not Included in Pre or Post
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change Outlier
ACN -8.57% 18.49% 27.05% 14.08% 0
AGII 30.16% -18.94% -49.09% 0
ALKS 6.69% 66.85% 60.15% 137.78% 0
ALLE -25.33% 0
AMAT -8.30% 6.53% 14.84% 29.68% 0
AON 11.73% 25.63% 13.90% 55.72% 0
ASPS 0
CVEO -162.16% 0
ENDP -1.47% -4.74% -3.27% -160.96% 0
ESV -22.99% 18.05% 41.04% -55.53% 0
ETN 10.85% 7.33% -3.52% 14.39% 0
GBLI -36.48% 4.70% 41.17% -99.49% 0
HZNP 158.28% 0.03% -158.25% 0
JAZZ 508.52% 95.11% -413.41% 1213.43% 1
LBTYA 30.98% -33.95% -64.93% 0
MDT 21.10% 3.23% -17.87% -22.29% 0
MYL 48.44% -14.33% -62.76% 0
PGN 1.62% 71.35% 69.72% -746.98% 1
PNR 10.12% 14.91% 4.79% 111.11% 0
PRGO 18.30% -3.62% -21.92% -79.60% 0
QSR 0.99% 0
RDC 29.40% -20.85% -50.25% -68.97% 0
SSYS 27.44% 9.78% -17.66% -310.42% 0
TBPH -2033.33% 1
TROX 1382.50% 1
TWGP -1046.59% 1
VRX 6.31% 34.76% 28.44% -94.07% 0
WMGI -6.39% 8.84% 15.23% 0
XL 11.84% 3.61% -8.23% 0
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average 38.53% 13.31% -25.22% -42.06%
Q1 -145.59%
Q3 25.86%
IQR 171.45%
Lower Bound -488.49%
Upper Bound 368.75%
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Co Inversion Year Included in Pre
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change Outlier
ACN 4.25% 18.49% 14.24% 18.80% 0
AGII 27.36% -18.94% -46.29% 0
ALKS 19.70% 66.85% 47.15% 126.98% 0
ALLE 30.04% 0
AMAT 4.56% 6.53% 1.97% 71.31% 0
AON 14.23% 25.63% 11.40% 30.91% 0
ASPS 0
CVEO -267.57% 0
ENDP 35.05% -4.74% -39.79% -72.97% 0
ESV -1.11% 18.05% 19.16% -47.12% 0
ETN 12.62% 7.33% -5.29% 12.50% 0
GBLI 27.65% 4.70% -22.95% -99.48% 0
HZNP 127.73% 0.03% -127.70% 0
JAZZ 375.00% 95.11% -279.89% 258.70% 0
LBTYA 26.34% -33.95% -60.28% 0
MDT 26.24% 3.23% -23.01% -15.39% 0
MYL 37.97% -14.33% -52.30% 0
PGN 4.28% 71.35% 67.06% -435.89% 1
PNR 19.29% 14.91% -4.38% 493.75% 1
PRGO 30.49% -3.62% -34.11% -74.44% 0
QSR 1120.00% 1
RDC 20.06% -20.85% -40.91% -68.42% 0
SSYS 56.14% 9.78% -46.36% -351.10% 0
TBPH -145.21% 0
TROX 535.95% 1
TWGP -1922.03% 1
VRX 54.74% 34.76% -19.98% -83.85% 0
WMGI 6.70% 8.84% 2.14% 0
XL 9.61% 3.61% -5.99% 0
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average 42.68% 13.31% -29.37% -39.78%
Q1 -95.57%
Q3 61.21%
IQR 156.78%
Lower Bound -409.12%
Upper Bound 374.76%
Do Some Stakeholders in Publicly Traded Firms Benefit at the Expense of Others as a 
Result of Corporate Inversions? 
Senior Capstone Project for Ryan Hitchcock 
- 32 - 
 
  
Co Inversion Year Included in Post
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change Outlier
ACN -8.57% 22.28% 30.85% 6.74% 0
AGII 30.16% -5.37% -35.53% 0
ALKS 6.69% 59.80% 53.11% 51.85% 0
ALLE -45.27% 0
AMAT -8.30% 14.45% 22.75% -4.52% 0
AON 11.73% 23.50% 11.76% 41.59% 0
ASPS 0
CVEO -175.44% 0
ENDP -1.47% 32.87% 34.33% -158.18% 0
ESV -22.99% 26.25% 49.24% -47.64% 0
ETN 10.85% 10.27% -0.58% 11.28% 0
GBLI -36.48% 55.10% 91.57% -67.58% 0
HZNP 158.28% 66.63% -91.65% 0
JAZZ 508.52% 99.39% -409.13% 1075.12% 1
LBTYA 30.98% -16.95% -47.93% 0
MDT 21.10% 10.90% -10.20% -23.37% 0
MYL 48.44% -3.87% -52.30% 0
PGN 1.62% 50.76% 49.14% -436.24% 0
PNR 10.12% 22.49% 12.37% 9.63% 0
PRGO 18.30% 15.88% -2.42% -70.07% 0
QSR -164.36% 0
RDC 29.40% -13.44% -42.84% -47.70% 0
SSYS 27.44% 44.37% 16.93% -223.15% 0
TBPH -1868.89% 1
TROX 1223.33% 1
TWGP -595.37% 1
VRX 6.31% 73.70% 67.39% -125.99% 0
WMGI -6.39% 16.85% 23.24% 0
XL 11.84% 4.37% -7.47% 0
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average 38.53% 27.74% -10.79% -81.58%
Q1 -162.81%
Q3 8.91%
IQR 171.72%
Lower Bound -506.25%
Upper Bound 352.34%
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Appendix D – List of peer firms 
 
  
Co Peer Firm
ACN NIELSEN HOLDINGS NV
AGII NAVIGATORS GROUP INC
ALKS CABOT MICROELECTRONICS CORP
ALLE GRIFFON CORP
AMAT BAKER HUGHES INC
AON MARSH & MCLENNAN COS
ASPS PAYCOM SOFTWARE INC
CVEO BELMOND LTD
ENDP ABRAXIS BIOSCIENCE INC
ESV SEADRILL LTD
ETN PACCAR INC
GBLI EMC INSURANCE GROUP INC
HZNP BIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALS INC
JAZZ ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS INC
MDT THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC
MYL ECOLAB INC
PNR NETAPP INC
QSR BRINKER INTL INC
RDC SANDRIDGE ENERGY INC
SSYS CAVIUM INC
TBPH PTC THERAPEUTICS INC
TROX SENSIENT TECHNOLOGIES CORP
VRX AGRIUM INC
WMGI NUVASIVE INC
XL UNUM GROUP
Do Some Stakeholders in Publicly Traded Firms Benefit at the Expense of Others as a 
Result of Corporate Inversions? 
Senior Capstone Project for Ryan Hitchcock 
- 34 - 
Appendix E – T-test of inversion firm volatility compared to S&P 500 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Std Dev-Pre S&P Inversions
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.1896 0.6863
Variance 0.0090 1.0372
Observations 8.0000 21.0000
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 21.0000
t Stat -2.2097
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0192
t Critical one-tail 1.7207
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0384
t Critical two-tail 2.0796
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Std Dev-Post S&P Inversions
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean 0.0986 0.4527
Variance 0.0005 0.1978
Observations 7.0000 25.0000
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 24.0000
t Stat -3.9629
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0003
t Critical one-tail 1.7109
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0006
t Critical two-tail 2.0639
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Appendix F – T-test of inversion firm returns compared to peers 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Pre Inversion Average Return
Inversions Matched Pairs
Mean 0.2628 0.2400
Variance 0.3150 0.0986
Observations 17.0000 17.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3623
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 16.0000
t Stat 0.1760
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4313
t Critical one-tail 1.7459
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.8625
t Critical two-tail 2.1199
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Post Inversion Average Return
Inversions Matched Pairs
Mean 0.1176 0.1502
Variance 0.0537 0.0409
Observations 24.0000 24.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2327
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 23.0000
t Stat -0.5920
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2798
t Critical one-tail 1.7139
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5596
t Critical two-tail 2.0687
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Appendix G – T-test of inversion firm volatility compared to peers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Pre Inversion Standard Deviation 
Inversions Matched Pairs
Mean 0.6708 0.6204
Variance 1.1469 0.2939
Observations 18.0000 18.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5717
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 17.0000
t Stat 0.2424
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4057
t Critical one-tail 1.7396
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.8114
t Critical two-tail 2.1098
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Post Inversion Standard Deviation 
Inversions Matched Pairs
Mean 0.4735 0.4056
Variance 0.2075 0.1593
Observations 23.0000 23.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2782
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df 22.0000
t Stat 0.6324
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2668
t Critical one-tail 1.7171
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5336
t Critical two-tail 2.0739
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